Faults with the Russian Armed Forces
By Jason Hwang, Brown University
Since the end of the Second World War, the Russian military was seen as a near-peer or even on-par with the American and NATO armed forces. However, after recent failures in Chechnya and Ukraine, the flaws of the Russian armed forces are becoming more and more apparent in contrast to the U.S. After all, the Russians have been fighting for years with a substantially less resourced rival. How can this be compared against the U.S. who obtained “victory” in 2003 against a country viewed as a major military power in a manner of weeks, Iraq? In the current Russo-Ukrainian War, the invasion was supposed to be the easy part, with an entrenched insurgency expected to be significantly more difficult than the initial invasion. After all, when the Americans invaded Iraq, the post-invasion insurgency was more devastating to American forces than the initial invasion. As such, it raises the question: Why have the Russians struggled so much in Ukraine?
One major flaw with the Russian Armed Forces relates to the retention of Russian soldiers. Currently, the Russian military lacks a well-trained and experienced Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corp which is central to NATO and NATO-adjacent forces. NCOs are enlisted soldiers who have leadership roles and are typically responsible for the training and well-being of their men. A well-trained and experienced NCO Corp allows institutional knowledge to be preserved within the military and helps lower-enlisted soldiers to be more effective in combat. In theory, an officer would plan an operation and the NCO would plan how the individual soldiers could effectively execute the plan. In doing so, the NCO is critical in allowing the higher-level operation to occur following in the vision of higher level officers. However, this requires the retention of individuals from lower-enlisted soldiers to the NCO position as well as trust between the NCO and the lower-enlisted soldiers. After all, if the lower enlisted soldiers can not trust their NCO, they will not be willing to follow the plans created by the NCO which would cause the operation to fail.
However, the Russian military is also notorious for hazing individuals of lower-rank. Eventually, when these individuals reach the end of their conscription, they become the abuser and abuse individuals who are of lower rank. Such examples of hazing include rape, beatings, and other forms of physical, mental, and sexual abuse. This cycle of abuse causes lower-enlisted soldiers to fear higher-ranked soldiers which would prevent soldiers from trusting their superiors with their lives. Similarly, the abuse creates a cycle of anger and hatred to their superior officer which, as we can observe from the Vietnam War, leads to ineffective operations and friendly-fire incidents. Furthermore, the cycle of abuse deters individuals from staying in the military which prevents the retention of institutional knowledge in the armed forces. The Russian Special Forces, Guard unit, or VDV units consist of all-volunteer individuals and a strong NCO Corp with the combination of a force that is highly motivated. There is also the additional benefit of greater training and funding; however, it is striking to notice that the presence of a strong NCO corp allows these units to have greater independence and institutional knowledge. Furthermore, this strong NCO Corp allows each unit to have their own form of culture and tradition which boosts unit cohesion and morale which also works to improve unit effectiveness.
Another point of concern is the culture of the Russian Armed Forces. In the Russian military, there seems to be an accepted culture of taking bribes and embezzlement of funds. In a military which has a high degree of connection to oligarchs and businesses, it is impossible to make decisions independent of economic gain. As such, in a military where every chain has an economic interest that may be counter to the overall goal of the military, it is impossible to effectively reform the military. Say, for instance, there arises an officer who wishes to drastically reform the armed forces. If this officer’s subordinates have economic interests that may be negatively affected by reforms, they have an economic incentive to disobey this order which would effectively prevent changes from occurring. Similarly, a culture of corruption and embezzlement would prevent the armed forces from obtaining basic equipment for the military or from obtaining state-of-the-art equipment that is able to face NATO equipment such as the F-22 and F-35, cutting-edge American fighter jets. Corruption is a fundamental flaw in any army and it is a plague which must be eradicated in order to allow the armed forces to have the most effective equipment possible. Similarly, in a country where oligarchs can “fall” out of windows with no subsequent investigations, it is apparent that any individual who harms the interest of the larger oligarch community is under grave, grave danger. As such, even if a Russian General is somehow able to get the support of the Russian President, who has as much of an interest in the corrupt status quo as his Generals, they are still at the whelm of the larger oligarch community which will force the reformer to carefully toe the lines of reform or risk an early death. Thus, according to this status quo, reform is impossible as the subordinates have an economic interest to disregard the changes of the reformer and the oligarchs also have an economic interest to either dismiss or assassinate the reformer. Alternatively, say that the President wanted reform. In order to do so, he needs political support from the oligarchs and military support from the men under him which is less and less feasible if there are economic interests that are entrenched in the armed forces. As such, to resolve this issue, there needs to be significant purges within the command structure of the armed forces and within the oligarchs who profit from the armed forces. Most recently, Deputy Defense Minister Timur Vadimovich Ivanov and General Vadim Anatolyevich Shamarin were arrested for accepting bribes.
Finally, in the Russian Armed Forces, there appears to be a trend of refusing to inform higher command about operational failures due to a top-down structure. The refusal of officers to inform higher-ranked officers about a failed operation causes higher command to have an inaccurate picture of the battlefield which causes operational mishaps. This misinformation causes the Kremlin to launch operations that are unrealistic in the actual field which causes the Russian forces to suffer unnecessary casualties. The failure of command to see a real picture of the state of the war also hinders the political front. In war, it is crucial for politicians to know the state of the war to determine the ideal time to make peace; however, this constant misinformation creates a false narrative of imminent victory which would prevent peace or any negotiation from happening. After all, why would one surrender or negotiate if victory is within grasp? Why would one sacrifice material to a side that is losing when they are clearly winning? If both sides perceive victory to be within grasp and both perceive that their front has the advantage, why would they be willing to sacrifice anything to obtain peace? This is a story seen time and time again but most dominantly in the stalemate of the First World War and the Korean War. Currently, both sides have given peace proposals which have content neither side will agree to. For instance, it seems unlikely that Russia is willing to accept the Ukrainian proposal to join NATO while it is unlikely that Ukraine is willing to accept the Russian proposal to occupy Crimea. As such, to break the stalemate, the Trump administration is likely to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia by halting US funding to Ukraine. It is clear that the Russian command had a false image of the war and that their vision of a war over in days is vastly inaccurate. Currently, there seems to be a culture of complacency as officers who fail can just argue they are following misguided orders to the letter and these officers who issued the orders will then be incentivized to lie about the status of the operation to look better.
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