Kurdish People: Victims of the Government or of Their Own Protectors?

By Victoria Krumova, Sciences Po—Menton

The Kurds are an ethnic group inhabiting the region of Kurdistan—territories in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. With a population of around 30 million people, the aim they have had for decades has been to establish a state. Until this state becomes a reality, they represent a minority in the respective states in which they are citizens. The largest population concentration of Kurds is in Turkey with an estimate of 16 million. Representing approximately 15-20% of the Turkish population, the Kurdish fight for equal treatment and recognition of their struggles by the international community has been a significant part of their political and social agenda. Their interests in Turkey are represented by two main actors with different approaches to the cause: the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, more commonly known as the PKK. The former is the third largest party in parliament and has taken a political and peaceful approach in trying to create space for discourse. Since 1984, the latter has been engaging in guerilla tactics with the Turkish state.

Progress was marked with the surprise proposal made in the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader’s speech when he offered the potential freeing of the imprisoned PKK leader and founder, in exchange for the disarmament of the PKK. The founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, has been imprisoned since 1999. He was given a life sentence on the charges of high treason, leading the armed insurgency of the PKK against the Turkish state. Despite his imprisonment, he has retained influence over the actions of the political organization; the PKK has remained loyal to him. Devlet Bahceli, an ally of Erdoğan, made this assertion in an effort to end the 40-year-old conflict between the Turkish government and Ocalan. It was deemed surprising, as his usual rhetoric until then was that of hatred targeting not only Ocalan, but also the PKK and even the DEM peaceful party, whom he says have connections with the PKK. On Oct. 1, 2024, Bahceli shook hands with DEM lawmakers, proving his dedication to peaceful coexistence of the two peoples. It was seen as atypical, however, in the realm of the possible when trying to fix the situation. A proposal to the leader of PKK has been more unexpected. Especially when Erdoğan who is the biggest ally of the Nationalist party has deemed Ocalan terrorist; and especially when numerous attacks have been launched on the Kurds of Ocalan just in the last year by Erdoğan’s administration. The proposal of Bahceli for freeing Ocalan reached the latter. He responded, "I have the theoretical and practical power to [transform] this process from one grounded in conflict and violence to one that is grounded on law and politics." If he wishes to exercise his power, or if he did wield it, remains unclear. However, in the following days, the Turkish Aerospace Industries’ (TUSAS) headquarters in Ankara was attacked and the PKK took responsibility for it. They said that the attack was the deed of the Immortal Battalion—an autonomous fraction of the PKK’s military arm—and they justified its actions as a response to the Turkish massacres on the Kurdish people, denying any connection with the Ocalan-Bahceli discourse. Looking at the actions of the Turkish forces in the last one to two years, one can make assumptions about what the PKK report referred to. In January of 2024, police detained 18 people for “praising terrorism”. This happened two days prior to Turkish soldiers being killed by the PKK. What is more, a high level PKK member was neutralized in Iraq, Turkish police seized 165 suspects over PKK links allegations and there have been multiple strikes on targets in the northern parts of Syria and Iran. Although the PKK wishes for the release of the leader, they see their bearing of arms as a way to ensure protection of the Kurdish population from the government’s attacks and unjust treatment. This attack carried out by the PKK might set back the chance for further dialogue with the government and, therefore, might further cement the public perception of the Kurds as a threat.

It is not entirely certain how this attack is perceived by the Kurdish population themselves. In a survey conducted by the Kurdish Studies Center in 2021, the majority of the Kurds in Turkey said that they feel Kurds and Turks are not equal before the state. Therefore, this attack, though a setback of the integration progress that might have been made with the disarmament of the PKK, can also be perceived as an act of defense and vengeance for the killed by the Turkish government.

However, more is needed than the efforts of Bahceli to improve the situation of the Kurds, whose daily lives are affected by the strained relations between the main political actors and the PKK. The long standing president finds himself in a delicate situation, needing to find a balance between keeping his ally while being politically volatile, especially due to lower voter’s support, the poor economic conditions in the country, and the escalated tensions in nearby Israel-Palestine and defending his stance on PKK being terrorist. Simultaneously, it is a question of whether Erdoğan is willing to make a compromise, and if that will win him more popular support amongst the Kurdish population, or will result in an overall loss of votes from the rest of the Turkish population.

Erdoğan is not the only actor on whom change is dependent. The DEM and the PKK have had complex relations over the years, as well. While Ocalan and other prominent political figures have labeled them to be allies, DEM has been distancing themselves from the Workers Party, with predominantly Leninist-Marxist beliefs, because of their possession of weapons and their acts of violence that go against the peaceful approach of the DEM. Hypothetically, if PKK was to abandon their arms, they would have shown that they are ready to make compromises in the name of the common good, and might have found an ally with the DEM. And with the efforts of the far-right National party to prove itself as one that defends unity, as expressed by Ocalan when shaking hands with the DEM lawmaker, the Kurds might have found themselves to be more popular and liked among parliament members.

If one retains a positive outlook, the DEM and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) share some similar beliefs on the Kurdish question. With the latter being left-wing and focusing itself on issues such as protection of human rights, the environment and social justices, it finds itself to be more popular in parliament, having a broader coalition of progressive and left-leaning fractions. And although it is not necessarily a Kurdish party, its main agenda is extremely relevant to the Kurdish national question. Therefore, common ground could potentially be found between them and actors that are willing to defend the Kurds’ interests. However, there are some coalitions that remain unimaginable. Agreements between DEM and MHP can work despite previous disagreements, when there is a common incentive to fix the Kurdish issue and, most importantly, because DEM’s main priority is this same issue. Comparatively, a chance for compromise and dialogue between HDP and MHP is close to impossible. HDP has other values such as establishing democratic reforms and a human rights-based approach to migrants and the border situation—a far cry from MHP’s nationalist approach on these topics. It is the exact policies of Erdoğan that the HDP is opposing, that the MHP associates itself with when allying with the long-standing president.

There has been an increase in voters’ support to the HDP and a decrease in votes for Erdoğan, so, perhaps, one can envision that the answer to integration of the Kurds in Turkish society is Erdoğan’s AKP party not being in power. Even then, the disarmament of the PKK would be a significant condition for deeper trust and collaboration between them and various political parties. Perhaps, with the downfall of Erdoğan, the PKK will have more trust that attacks on them will not be carried out and they would be more willing to disarm.

Regardless, a political downfall of Erdoğan, at this time, seems rather unlikely. While it is true that the deteriorating economic conditions in the country led many voters to abandon the AKP and to place their hope in others, the escalating situation of Israel and Palestine has led others to vote for a government that advocates against a more lenient border control, and that remains strict in its nationalist beliefs. The coalition of Erdoğan with the MHP in the last election cycle is what gained votes and stabilized their position as the one of winners despite losing in big cities like Ankara and Istanbul.

A recognition of an independent Kurdish state does not seem to be possible in the coming years. A change in the Kurdish situation just in Turkey seems equally as difficult. With the complex interests of the various political parties competing on the unstable Turkish political landscape, the volatile economic situation, foreign conflicts shifting public perception, and an overwhelmed by political realities people, the Kurds fall victim to the current government and their allies and the lack of compromises of the PKK and other political figures advocating for their rights. It is not a question of only public perception of the Kurds by the rest of the Turkish population when voting, it is a complex interplay between all of the issues that need fixing. And on the hierarchy of problems needing to be handled, the rights of Kurds seem to fall behind to protection from increasing migration from the East and, therefore, the risk of a further downfall of the economy.

Cover photo taken from Wikipedia.